Abstract-Practical implementations of secret-key generation are often based on sequential strategies, which handle reliability and secrecy in two successive steps, called reconciliation and privacy amplification. In this paper, we propose an alternative scheme based on polar coding that jointly deals with reliability and secrecy. We study a binary degraded symmetric discrete memoryless source model with uniform marginals, and assume one-way rate-limited public communication between two legitimate users. Specifically, we propose secret-key capacity-achieving polar coding schemes, in which users rely on pre-shared secret seed of negligible rate. For the model studied, we thus provide the first example of low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving scheme that handles vector quantization, for rate-limited public communication. Furthermore, we provide examples for which no seed is required.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret-key generation [1] plays a crucial role in informationtheoretic security. Closed-form expressions for the secretkey capacity have been derived for numerous models [1] - [5] . However, with the exception of sequential methods, such as [6] , [7] for unlimited communication rate and [8] , [9] for rate-limited public communication, few achievability schemes provide insight into practical implementations of secret-key generation. Vector quantization is required in case of ratelimited communication, and to the best of our knowledge, no low complexity schemes are known. This paper presents a practical low-complexity capacity-achieving scheme based on polar codes [10] for some classes of sources. Note that polar codes have already been used for secrecy with the wire-tap channel model [11] - [15] , and for a problem related to secretkey generation, the Slepian-Wolf coding problem [16] - [18] .
Unlike sequential methods, which successively handle reliability and secrecy by means of reconciliation and privacy amplification, our scheme jointly deals with reliability and secrecy. Both the sequential reliability-secrecy approach, and the direct approach with polar codes have their advantages. On the one hand, sequential methods offer flexibility in design by separating reliability and secrecy, and remain optimal for twoway communication and continuous non degraded sources [9] . On the other hand, polar coding schemes may be easier to design in some scenarios, and appear to be very handy to deal with vector quantization when the public communication is rate-limited.
In this paper, we study secret-key generation for a binary degraded (symmetric) discrete memoryless source (BD(S)DMS) model with one-way public communication. We assume that
Rate-limited source model for secret-key generation the legitimate users share beforehand a secret seed 1 , which rate can be chosen arbitrarily small. Our main contributions are the following.
• For a BDDMS, we propose a polar coding scheme that achieves the secret-key capacity for an unlimited public communication rate; • For a BDSDMS with uniform marginals, we design a polar coding scheme that achieves the secret-key capacity with a limited public communication rate. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally introduce the problem studied in the paper. In Section III, we present a capacity-achieving polar coding sheme for an unlimited public communication rate. In Section IV, we assume a rate-limited public communication, and present a capacity-achieving polar coding sheme for a source with uniform marginals. In Section V, we also present two scenarios for which no seed is required.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We define a BDDMS (X YZ, p XY Z ), as a DMS such that X = {0, 1}, Y, Z are arbitrary finite discrete alphabets, and X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain. A BDSDMS is similarly defined, but in addition, the channels associated to p Y |X and p Z|X are symmetric. Moreover, we say that a BDSDMS has uniform marginals, if X ∼ B(1/2), where B(p) denotes the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ∈ [0, 1]. As illustrated in Figure 1 , we consider that two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve, observe the components, X, Y , and Z of a BD(S)DMS, respectively. The source is assumed to be outside the control of all parties, but its statistics are known to all parties. One-way communication is allowed from Alice to Bob over an authenticated noiseless public channel with rate R p ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. A secret-key generation strategy is formally defined as follows. Definition 1. Let K be a key alphabet of size 2 N R . The protocol defined by the following steps is called a (2 N R , N, R p ) secret-key generation strategy, and is denoted by S N . 1) Alice observes X N while Bob observes
The performance of a secret-key generation strategy S N is measured in terms of the average probability of error between the key K generated by Alice and the keyK generated by Bob P e (S N ) P[K =K], in terms of the information leakage to the eavesdropper L(S N ) I(K; Z N A), and in terms of the uniformity of the keys U(S N ) log 2 N R − H(K).
Definition 2. A secret-key rate R is achievable for a source model if there exists a sequence of (2
Moreover, the supremum of such a rate R is called the secret-key capacity and is denoted C WSK (R p ).
In the following sections, we propose capacity-achieving schemes based on polar coding.
III. ACHIEVABILITY OF C WSK (+∞)
In this section, we assume an unlimited public communication rate, i.e. R p = +∞. We recall the expression of C WSK (+∞) in the following proposition.
In Theorem 1, we refine the earlier work started in [20] . Theorem 1. Consider a BDDMS (X YZ, p XY Z ). Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret seed. The secret-key capacity C WSK (+∞) is achievable by a polar coding scheme. Moreover, the seed rate is in o 2 −N β /2 , β < 1/2, where N is the blocklength.
B N be the source polarization transform defined in [16] , and set
In the following, we denote the complement set operation by the superscript c. Define the following sets
; the data processing inequality also guarantees F c B ⊂ F c E , since X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain. As in [16] , for a pair of random variables (X, Y ) distributed according to p XY over X × Y, we define the Bhattacharyya parameter as
Using the same technique as [21, Lemma 20] , we can show the following counterpart of [16, Proposition 1] .
1) Let α < 1/2. Define the set
Similarly to [21, Theorem 19] , we can show with Lemma 2, By [16, Theorem 3] , Bob can reconstruct K from A and A with an error probability satisfying P e (S N ) = O 2 −N β . Moreover, by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the key rate clearly achieves the secret-key capacity. We now establish the strong secrecy and the uniformity of the key. We need the following lemma. 
where the last inequality follows from the definition of F c E .
We have
We write the first term in (1) as,
We bound the second term in (1) as,
where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy and (b) holds by Lemma 3. Hence, combining (1), (2) and (3),
The seed rate is in o(n) by Lemma 1, but we can reduce it further by performing block encoding [15] . Assume we repeat the previous secret-key generation strategy over k blocks of length N . For i ∈ 1, k , we note A i the secret seed needed to obtain K i , the secret key generated over the block i. First, we need |A 1 | secret bits to perform the secret-key generation over the first block, then for i ∈ 2, k , we can use |A i | bits of the secret key generated with block i − 1, to privately transmit A i and generate K i . This operation does not affect the key rate per block for large N , since for all i ∈ 1, k , |A i |= o(N ) by Lemma 1. Consequently, we only need to secretly transmit |A 1 | bits, which translates to an overall seed rate |A 1 |/(kN ). We can choose k = 2 We omit the proof due to space constraint. Remark 2. Recall that, for lossless source coding, there is a fundamental trade-off between error probability and uniformity of the encoder output with respect to the variational distance [22, Section V] . However, as shown in [23] , [24] , this impossibility can be overcome if the encoder and the decoder share a small seed beforehand. In our coding scheme, this translates to the impossibility of ensuring strong secrecy and strong uniformity simultaneously, unless the legitimate users share a small seed.
In this section, as depicted in Figure 2 , we consider a ratelimited public communication rate R p ∈ R + , between the legitimate users, and a BDSDMS (X YZ, p XY Z ) with uniform marginals, where X = Y = Z, and such that Y X ⊕ B 1 and Z Y ⊕ B 2 , with B 1 ∼ B(p), B 2 ∼ B(q). We recall in the following proposition the closed-form expression of the secret-key capacity for this setup.
Proposition 2 ( [9]
). Let R p ∈ R + . Define the following associative and commutative operation a b
with H b (·) the binary entropy, and β 0 , any of the two symmetric solutions of the equation
Theorem 2. Consider a BDSDMS (X YZ, p XY Z ) with uniform marginals. Assume that Alice and Bob share a secret seed and let R p ∈ R + . The secret-key capacity C WSK (R p ) is achievable by a polar coding scheme. Moreover, the seed rate is in o 2 −N β /4 , β < 1/2, where N is the blocklength.
Observe that by Proposition 2, for any
Theorem 1, the assumption of uniform distribution can be removed in Theorem 2, as long as R p H(X|Y ).
Proof: Our proof is inspired by polar coding for the Wyner-Ziv problem [21] . We assume R p H(X|Y ), since the case R p H(X|Y ) is deduced from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2. Let > 0, β ∈]0, 1/2[. Let n ∈ N and N 2 n . We define δ N , the i-th bit channel, as defined in [10] , corresponding to a binary symmetric channel with parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. Define the following sets
where β 0 is defined in (4).
Proof: We first show 1). Assume i ∈ F S , then, by [21, Lemma 21], we have Z Assume we encode Alice's observations x N as in [21, Theorem 3] , using the successive-cancellation encoder for the polar code defined by the frozen set F S , i.e. we perform lossy source coding with distortion β 0 . We note the output of this encoding processÛ . The following lemma states that the encoder outputÛ is asymptotically uniform in divergence.
Lemma 5. Consider the lossy source coding problem, and assume the same encoding as in [21, Theorem 3] using the polar code defined by the frozen set F S . IfÛ is the encoder output, then
Proof: By [25, Lemmas 4, 5] .
We define a secret-key generation strategy S N as follows. we treat the secret communication by block encoding [15] to obtain an arbitrarily small seed rate.
By [21, Theorem 14] , Bob can reconstruct K from A and A with an error probability satisfying P e (S N ) = O (δ N ) . Moreover, by the expression C WSK (R p ) in Proposition 2, and Lemma 4, the key rate is capacity-achieving. We also satisfy the public communication constraint between Alice and Bob, since by Lemma 4, we have for N large enough
We now show the strong secrecy and the uniformity of the key. As in the proof of Theorem 1 ,we have
We bound the second term in (5) as,
where (a) holds by Lemma 4 and because conditioning reduces entropy, (b) holds by Lemma 5 and because conditioning reduces entropy. The last term in (6) is bounded as follows
where (c) holds by [10, Proposition1] , and (d) holds by definition of F E . By Lemma 4, we write the first term in (5) 
Hence, combining (5), (6) , (7) and (8), we obtain L(S N ) + U(S N ) δ N + 2N δ N .
V. SCENARIOS FOR WHICH NO SEED IS REQUIRED
Although the seed rate that the legitimate users need to share in Sections III, IV can be made arbitrarily small, it is interesting to identify examples for which no seed is required. Example 1. Consider a DMS (X YZ, p XY Z ) with X = {0, 1}. Assume that Alice and Bob have the same observations, i.e. X = Y , then the secret-key capacity C WSK = H(X|Z) is achievable by a polar coding scheme.
Note that Example 1 corresponds to the setting of privacy amplification [26] . Example 3. Consider a BDSDMS (X Y, p XY ) with uniform marginals, and the same setting as in Section IV with Z = ∅. The secret-key capacity is denoted C SK and
where β 0 is defined in (4). For any R p ∈ R + , C SK (R p ) is achievable by a polar coding scheme.
We omit the proofs of Examples 1, 2, 3 due to space constraint.
